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Abstract
Because of market fragmentation, nowadays Chinese 
horizontal integrating firms are in a “two-line battle” 
competition both against MNEs and local firms. This 
paper attempted to discuss how can a firm, in such “two-
line battle” competition, adopt a suitable competitive 
repertoire matching with its organizational coordination, 
and how dose market fragmentation have influence on 
this matching, if there is any. This paper, by empirically 
testing Chinese firms from three industries, found out 
that coordination has a negative moderating effect 
between complexity of repertoire and performance. 
Moreover, market fragmentation has weakening impact 
to the interaction between complexity and coordination. 
The conclusion enriched the analysis framework of 
competitive action (or repertoire) decision, and brought 
better understanding of the impacts of institutional context 
on firm competitive behavior. 
Key words: Repertoire; Competitive complexity; 
Coordination; Market fragmentation
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INTRODUCTION
Since China joining in WTO, Chinese domestic market 
has been weighted and interested by lots of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). With more and more MNEs entering 
Chinese domestic market, Chinese firms are facing bigger 
and bigger threats and increasingly eager to enhance 
international competitiveness. Many scholars and 
successful entrepreneurs have figured out that, Chinese 
firms need build their own specific advantages on the 
basis of national advantage of China, like market scale, 
labor costs, et al. Thus firms want to enhance international 
competitiveness have to initially accomplish horizontal 
integration with merger or investment (Lan, 2007). 
However, during the process of horizontal integration, 
Chinese firms are interrupted by a special institutional 
context in transitional economy, called the market 
fragmentation (Yong, 2000). The market fragmentation 
refers to an institutional difference and barrier between 
each Chinese local (provincial) government. Market 
fragmentation is not only isolating resources in each local 
region and blocking cross-regional resources integration 
by firms, but also encouraging a big group of local firms 
which have little competitiveness by controlling regional 
market relying on the local policies. Most of these local 
firms don’t have advantage in market competition but can 
build market barrier by regional policies and institution, 
so they mostly not expending their business beyond the 
authorities of local government and diversified in multiple 
business (Lan & Pi, 2011). When some other firms 
entering the regional market, they usually will implement 
market and non-market action against the competitor, but 
not easily be hurt or damaged in short term. So these local 
firms cause competitive threats to horizontal integrating 
firms in long term. Therefore, Chinese horizontal 
integrating firms (the focal firms) are mainly in a 
competition structure called “two-line battle”, simultaneously 
competing against MNEs and bunch of local firms. 
The “two-line battle” is determined by the market 
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fragmentation. Without market fragmentation, the local 
governments would have not such huge power to interrupt 
the market economic behavior, and the local firms, 
horizontal integrating firms, and MNEs could compete in 
one single market rule, their major difference would be 
market scale instead of strategic orientations. However, 
under the market fragmentation, local firms and MNEs 
are competing differently with two categories of resources 
and capabilities. Thus horizontal integrating firms have 
to adopt no less than two different competing strategies 
for the two different groups of competitors. Therefore, 
they should apply a repertoire with a set of different 
competing actions under the “two-line battle”. Because 
this competitive repertoire contains different competing 
intention and strategies, the focal firms need to create 
a more flexible and powerful organization to support 
various and irrelevant resources. And also, the specific 
organization and competitive repertoire are under a special 
institutional context, the market fragmentation. 
About organizational resources or mechanism 
affecting competitive actions, previous researches on 
dynamic competition are more likely to concern about 
the influence of top manager team on competition 
decisions (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004), but few discuss about 
the effects of organizational management and structure on 
competitive actions. Chen and Hambrick (1995) figured 
out that the size of a firm can affect the speed of action 
implementation. Lamberg, Tikkanen, Nokelainen and 
Suur-Inkeroinen (2009) built a theoretical framework, 
which indicated that organizational resources like 
managerial pattern and structure have influence on attacking 
and replying actions of firms. Nevertheless, Lamberg, 
et al didn’t deeply explore the affection mechanism of 
organizational resources on competitive actions and 
repertoire. On the other hand, institutional environment 
has been regarded as exogenous variable in competition 
researches (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Deng, et al. 2010), few 
researches tried to testify and explore the direct and indirect 
influence of institutional environment on competitive actions. 
This  paper  t r ied to  explore  the  inf luence of 
organizational coordination on competitive repertoire of 
horizontal integrating firms, and discuss the moderating 
effects of market fragmentation between performance and 
coordination, repertoire, and both. This research is not 
only supplementing the analysis framework of competitive 
behavior and deepening understanding the effects of 
institutional context on firm’s behavior, but also finding 
effective matching relationship between organizational 
coordination and competitive repertoire of Chinese horizontal 
integrating firms for the special “two-line battle”.
1.  LITERATURE BACKGROUND
1.1  Competitive Dynamics 
1.1.1  Dynamic Competitive Behavior
The competitive behavior is defined as “any visible 
action which could be possible to gain market share from 
competitor or reduce expected performance (or revenue) 
of competitor.” (Venkataraman, Chen & MacMillan, 
1997). The analysis and calculation about whether and 
how will a firm start a competitive behavior is one of the 
most important issues in competitive dynamics. Chen 
(1996), on the basis of previous researchers, proposed 
market commodity and resources similarity as two major 
factors for analyzing competitive actions. Both of these 
two factors is external factor, because both of the two 
factors are comparative indexes, which revealing the 
comparison of strategic resources and market position 
between competitor and focal firm. 
The SCP theory thinks that any conduction of a firm 
is implemented under a specific organizational structure. 
Thus the organizational structure and mechanism have 
definitely effects on competitive behavior. Chen and 
Hambrick (1995) found out that the smaller the size of 
the firm, the faster the action implemented. But they did 
not discuss the influence of the information sharing and 
resources synergy on competitive action. Lamberg et al. 
(2009) proposed a theoretical framework, in which the 
organizational resources are considered as a factor of 
attacking or replying actions, though the framework is not 
empirically testified. Although Mathew (2000) mentioned 
that competitive action are all on the basis of appropriate 
resources and capabilities, so that organizational 
mechanism, like effectiveness and systematicness of 
organization, is a factor to competitive behavior, but few 
empirical research explore the affection mechanism. 
1.1.2  Competitive Repertoire
While discussing competing strategies for multiple 
competitors, people usually study with a repertoire. 
Competitive repertoire refers to “set of actions pursued 
by an organization to attract, serve, and keep customers” 
(Miller & Chen, 1996a, 1996b). In the studies of 
competitive repertoire, the complexity of repertoire, also 
called competitive complexity, is one of the character 
which mostly interested (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 
1999; Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj, & Grover, 2003; 
Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2006). The competitive 
complexity refers to the scope of variety (Ferrier et al., 
1999; Nayyar & Bantel, 1994) and fields (Gnyawali et 
al., 2006) of actions implemented by a firm. Nayyar and 
Bantel (1994) mentioned that if a firm adopt competitive 
actions from different dimensions (such as R&D, 
marketing, production, and logistics), then its repertoire 
could be complex. 
Previous researches emphasized the importance of 
competitive complexity to performance (Ferrier et al., 
1999). However, few researches discuss the organizational 
mechanism behind the complex repertoires. Competitive 
actions are on the basis of specific resources, thus 
complex repertoire means spreading resources and 
capabilities along the value chain, instead of gathering 
and integrating. Thus what organizational mechanism 
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could support a firm to implement a repertoire with high 
complexity, is still a un-know question. 
1.2  Coordination in Horizontal Integration
While a firm growing horizontally, with its organizational 
boundary expending, it will inevitably facing a new 
emerging managerial question: how to allocate resources 
inside the new organizational boundary, and increase 
the operation effectiveness (Ensign, 1998; Podobnik 
& Dolinšek, 2008). A few researchers introduced 
coordination, or say activities coordination, as an 
important factor of organizational management (Julian & 
Goddard, 2009; Ricardo, Dessein, & Matouschek, 2006). 
The coordination refers to reasonable allocation of inner 
resources of a firm, and the information communication 
and sharing among branch offices and departments 
(Paterson & Brock, 2002). The coordination presents the 
operation of a firm, centralizing materials purchasing, 
marketing dealing, and qualities of products and 
services cause higher coordination, while decentralized 
the operation cause a lower coordination. Therefore, 
higher coordination means optimizing the operation 
system (Adler, 1995), and enhance the capabilities of 
organizational learning and communicating (Yanchun 
Li et al., 2013). Meanwhile, coordination is also built on 
the basis of a centralized and scientific network of supple 
chain and marketing channel (Benito, 2003). 
1.3  Market Fragmentation
The transition economy of China is pushed under an 
important institutional setting, decentralization enliven. 
It means central government spreads and delivers part 
of their authority downside to local governments, so 
that local governments can make their own regional 
(provincial) policies and rules for industries and markets 
basing on specific situation of each province or city. 
The central government, while encouraging the local 
governments to lead the regional economy grow toward 
the market economy and globalization, set economic grow 
as the major KPI (key performance indicators) of the local 
governmental performance evaluation, which naturally 
cause regional competition and local protection (Bai, Du, 
Tao & Tong, 2004). Scholars summarize such market 
economy a fragmented market economy, or say “small 
market economy”(Young, 2000). In specific, market 
fragmentation (or say segmentation) refers to the local 
government is over-authorized to interrupt the business 
behavior in their authorizing area, and the market rules 
and policies between regions (provinces) are distinct. 
Most local governments, in purpose of self-performance, 
propose tendentious regional policies to encourage any 
firm investing in their own authority area to set the 
headquarter in there, to gain the contribution of GDP 
grow the tax (Pi, 2008). Some even request firm entering 
the region to choose local supplier, sales dealer and other 
services in priority (Song & Zeng, 2011). 
The market fragmentation is determined by the basic 
institution of Chinese transition economy, so it exists 
stably all over the country in long term. But in short 
term and partial of the nation, market fragmentation and 
its influence to firms are dynamic. This is because the 
market institution and policies in all local governments 
are developing and changing. A specific province, 
with its own geographic character and social economic 
development stage, has a special problem in economy 
transition. Therefore they need different and flexible 
policies for the dynamic developmental issues. Also 
different provinces are various industrial structure, 
thus the industrial policies are also various. All these 
differences cause the development of market economy in 
each province are different, which eventually leads to two 
results: one is a single province have different content and 
extent of the local protection in different period, the other 
is the extent of variety of regional institutions around the 
whole nation are various in each period. 
2. HYPOTHESIS
2.1  Competitive Complexity and Coordination
High complexity of competitive repertoire require 
the focal firm implement each action and switch to 
another rapidly, so that it can dispense the following 
and expectation by its competitors (Chen, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1992). This will draw some scholars to believe 
that competitive complexity have positive impact to 
performance (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). Increasing the extent 
of competitive complexity is beneficial for focal firm to 
have the initiative in competitive interaction, and to avoid 
the replying by competitor (Chen, Venkataraman, Black & 
MacMillan, 2002; Quasney, 2003). Moreover, competitive 
complexity indicates that focal firm has powerful 
resources and capabilities in multi-point of its value chain, 
which could become a kind of multi-point advantage to its 
competitors (Edward, 1955). 
In Chinese transition economy, horizontal integrating 
firms are in “two-line battle”, facing two types of 
competitors. For the strategic resources and capabilities 
of the two types of competitors various, horizontal 
integrating firms have to simultaneously allocate and 
apply different strategic resources to make forbearance 
with resources similarity with these two type of 
competitors (Chen, 1996). And also, integrating horizontal 
firms have to adopt rapid and diversified actions to build 
advantages to both types of competitor, to avoid re-actions 
by MNEs and local firms with speed and innovation. 
Both the resources base and the action character lead 
the horizontal integrating firm to increase competitive 
complexity when interacting with MNEs and local firms. 
H1a: Competitive complexity has positive effects on 
performance. 
Theore t ica l ly,  emphas iz ing  coord ina t ion  of 
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organization means boosting the effectiveness of 
resources allocation (Ensign, 1998; Podobnik & Dolinsek, 
2008), reducing the managerial and learning costs, and 
enhancing capabilities of innovation (Li et al., 2013). 
However, coordination also means centralizing resources 
in operation system, which could damage the possibilities 
and qualities of repertoire which has various types of 
competitive actions. Instead, increasing organizational 
coordination will drive focal firm to compete rely on one 
singe competitive action which is high innovative, such as 
the iphone series products by Apple.
If facing one single (type of) competitor (s), single type 
of action or multiple types of action might have similar 
effects in competition interaction. But when a focal firm 
is facing two types of competitors, especially when it 
were in the “two-line battle” caused by institutional 
context, centralizing its resources is less possible to create 
advantages in both lines. 
H1b: Coordination has negative effect between 
competitive complexity and performance. 
2.2  Effects of Market Fragmentation 
Market fragmentation not only interrupts normal business 
behavior, but also separates the domestic market scope. 
Under market fragmentation, Chinese domestic market 
contains two levels: 1) single regional markets which 
under supervise of local governments in issues of quality 
and so on, and 2) national market which is directly 
supervised by the central government in issue of market 
accessing. Products in regional market of every region are 
relying on the regional market channel (advertiser, dealer, 
and even logistics), and products in national market would 
rely on the national (mostly state owned) market channel 
and suppliers. Generally, regional firms most exists in 
regional markets and MNEs are strongly threatening in 
national market. 
Therefore, any competitive action is implemented in a 
specific market scope, some in national level, some in a 
single regional market, and some in another one or several 
regional market (s). This will cause focal firm harder to 
implement multiple types of actions in any market scope. 
On the other hand, the market fragmentation narrows 
the competing rivalry. Horizontal integrating firms can 
allocate different resources and capabilities in different 
market scope for specific competitor. For instance, a 
horizontal integrating firm can adopt actions in national 
market to eliminate the market scale of each regional 
market, or adopt regional actions to reduce the market 
commodity with MNEs, so as to build forbearance 
with MNEs. Focal firms with any of these competitive 
strategies will not have urge to implement repertoire with 
high complexity. Thus market fragmentation weakens 
the motivation and effectiveness of focal firm to increase 
competitive complexity. 
On the other hand in perspective of competitor, 
dynamics of market fragmentation determines the 
extent of threats of MNEs and local firms to horizontal 
integrating firms. When the influence of market 
fragmentation grows, institutional gaps among regions of 
China becomes obvious, thus regional firms have bigger 
threats. Because the local firms are numerous, the multiple 
types of action by focal firm might not have advantages 
for all of its competitors, no talking these local firms 
are good at competing with non-market actions. When, 
in the opposite, the influence of market fragmentation 
reduces, institutional gaps among regions of China are 
restrained, then MNEs are easier to enter domestic market 
and becomes the bigger competing threats for horizontal 
integrating firms. While focal firm may have difficulty in 
build advantage against MNEs from one singe dimension 
of value chain, repertoire of complexity will be suitable 
for leading MNEs tired to replying in different types of 
action from various regions. 
H2a: Influence of market fragmentation has negative 
effect between competitive complexity and performance.
As discussed above, market fragmentation has 
negative effects on performance growth. On the 
other hand, however, market fragmentation may have 
indirect support through coordination. Because of local 
protection and competition between local governments, 
market fragmentation barriers firm’s cross-region 
integration. This barrier damages the effectiveness 
of operating resources after horizontal integration. 
Thus, horizontal firms occasionally satisfy the region-
governmental demands under pre-assumption of not 
crash the enter beneficial operation system, including 
setting more than one headquarters in different provinces, 
choosing local sales dealers for marketing, and adopting 
regional suppliers and even producers if quality under 
controlled. These “compromise” actions cause horizontal 
firm decreases, in a certain extent, the organizational 
coordination. As H1b, for Chinese horizontal integrating 
firms, reducing coordination, though less innovative, 
could help to maintain high complexity of their 
competitive repertoire. 
When the influence of market fragmentation increases 
and local firms are more threatening, focal firm needs 
to highlight the coordination and to start nationwide 
and innovative competitive actions against all its local 
competitors. While the influence of market fragmentation 
decreases and MNEs are more threatening, focal firm 
needs to comparatively reduce the coordination for 
multiple types of action against MNEs. 
H2b:  Inf luence of  market  f ragmentat ion has 
moderating effects on the interacting impact of 
competitive complexity and coordination on performance. 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1  Research Method and Sample 
Chen and MacMillan (1992) started to apply content 
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analysis into the study of competitive dynamics for 
coding information about competitive behavior from 
media reports. Information of gathered with this method 
can only represent the “visible” competitive behavior 
(Venkataraman et al., 1997). Thus content analysis 
(also called structure content analysis) becomes the 
major method for coding competitive action data (Chen 
& MacMillan, 1992). This paper also applied content 
analysis for gathering and coding data about competitive 
actions and repertoire. 
This paper chose firms listed in Shanghai or (and) 
Shenzhen stock market as sample. For specifically 
study the horizontal integrating firms, 26 firms from air-
conditioner, real-estate, and automobile industries are 
chosen, with their annual reports and media reports since 
2001 to 2012 gathered, coded, and analyzed. 
3.2  Competitive Action
Competitive actions are usually categorized by scholar 
basing the industrial features. Xie (2003) categorized 
competitive actions into 12 types during analyzing the 
competing networks of Chinese TV manufactories, such 
as proposing new products, enlarging production, entering 
new market, entering new business, cooperation and 
allies, cooperating with banks, merger and acquisition, 
decreasing prices, increasing prices, important promotion, 
investing abroad, and other. Diao (2009) categorized 
competitive actions into 10 types when studying Chinese 
beer industry, such as proposing now product, important 
promotion, investing abroad, enlarging production, 
entering new market, cooperation and allies, merger and 
acquisition, decreasing prices, increasing prices, and other. 
Concerning the character of the three sample industries, 
this paper categorized competitive actions into 8 types: 
investment or merger, cooperation and allies, proposing 
new products, proposing new technology, opening new 
store or entering new market, changing organizational 
structure or marketing system, changing prices, and taking 
public relationship activities. 
3.3  Variables Measurement
3.3.1  Dependent Variable
Following Chen (2009), this paper chose ROA as the 
index of dependent variable, the performance. To take 
over the industrial difference, this paper standardized the 
value of ROA. 
Independent Variable
Competitive complexity. This paper follows Ferrier’s 
(1999) measure for complexity, as function (1):
    ( )
21/ /a L
a
Com N NT= ∑  (1)
Whereas Na refers to the frequency of competitive 
action a in a certain year, and NTL refers to the sum of 
frequencies of all competitive actions in the year. 
3.3.2  Moderating Variables
Coordination 
Following some scholars, this paper measures 
coordination with the proportion of related party 
transactions (Westney & Zaheer, 2003; Moon & Kim, 
2008), the proportion materials purchased from top-
5 suppliers, and the proportion of sales revenue to top-
5 dealers (customers) (Birkinshaw & Goddard, 2009). 
This paper calculated the entropy weighted value of these 
three measures. 
Influence of Market fragmentation 
Presently, scholars measure market fragmentation 
of China in many methods. Fan, Wang and Zhu (2011) 
represented market fragmentation with the NERI indexes 
of all provinces. This paper adopted the NERI indexes of 
all provinces in China since 2001 to 20121, to indicate that 
the essential of market fragmentation is the differences 
of regional institutional differences among provinces. 
However, just applying NERI indexes cannot represent 
the specific impacts of market fragmentation on firms. 
Moreover, firms are impact variously by the regional 
institutional differences because of the location of 
headquarter (Song & Zeng, 2011). Therefore the variable 
about market fragmentation MFt is measured as: 
  
 
31
2( )
31
tH ti
i
t
m m
MF
−
=
∑  (2)
Whereas refers to the NERI index in t year of the 
province where headquarter located, and mti  refers to the 
ENRI index in t year of other provinces in China. 
To acknowledge, all measurement of competitive 
complexity, coordination and market fragmentation are 
categorized according to the means (valued 1 if lower than 
means, and value 2 if higher than means) of the sample in 
each industry. 
3.3.3  Control Variables
Because competitive behavior has strong association 
with resources and previous growth of the firm (Miller & 
Chen, 1994), this paper chose the time of firm built, and 
resources slack as control variables, while resources slack 
majorly measured by size of firm Chen and Hambrick 
(1995) and the current ratio of (proportion of current 
assets to current debts) (Miller & Chen, 1994). Also 
the three control variables are standardized to avoid the 
industrial differences. 
4.  ANALYSIS RESULTS
Following similar research by Lin and Germain (2003), 
this paper applied multiple linear regression model with 
SPSS 16.0. The results of analysis are as Table 1and 2. 
To ensure the validity and reliability of the variables 
transformed from continuous variable into 0-1 variables, 
an ANOVA is done to the variables of competitive 
complexity, coordination, and market fragmentation, as 
shown in Table 1. In Table 1, the mean square between 
1 We calculated the five-year average trend values for the market 
indexes in year of 2011 and 2012, because Fan didn’t public the 
market indexes in those two years. 
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groups of all variables is higher than the mean square 
inside group, with the F test are highly significant 
(p<0.001). Thus, all 0-1 variables in this paper are valid. 
The regression results are shown in Table 2. 
Model1-a, 1-b, 2-a, and 2-b are all significantly F tested, 
which means the regression models have good fitting 
degree. Moreover, Model 1-b and 2-a have higher R 
square adjusted values than Model 1-a, while Model 2-b 
have higher R square adjusted value than Model 1-b, 
which refers all moderation effects are testified by the 
empirical analysis. 
As Model 1-a, competitive complexity (FZ) have 
significantly (p<0.001) positive effect on performance, 
thus H1a is accepted. As Model 1-b, coordination (XT) 
and FZ have significantly (p<0.05) negative interacting 
effects on performance, thus H1b is accepted. As Model 
2-a, market fragmentation (MF) and FZ has comparatively 
significantly (p<0.1) negative effect on performance, thus 
H2a is partially accepted. As Model 2-b, MF, XT, and FZ 
together have comparatively significantly (p<0.1) negative 
effect on performance, thus H2b is partially accepted. 
Table 1 
ANOVA
FZ Sum S.D Mean square F value Significant 
Between groups 3.139 1 3.139 206.229 0.000
Inside group 4.004 263 0.015   
XT   
Between groups 31.808 1 31.808 6.893 0.009
Inside group 1213.675 263 4.615   
MF
Between groups 5840.564 1 5840.564 338.335 0.000
Inside group 4540.083 263 17.263   
Table 2 
Multiple Linear Regression 
 Model1-a Model1-b Model2-a Model2-b
(Constant) (-1.394) (1.258) (1.107) (-2.976)** (-3.117)** (-1.261) (-2.039)*
Control
RS
-0.024
(-.388)
-0.018
(-0.223)
0.045
(0.701)
-0.003
(-0.043)
-0.063
(-1.017)
-0.057
(-0.882)
-0.081
(-1.259)
NF
0.175**
(2.857)
0.166**
(2.647)
0.128**
(2.941)
0.172**
(2.837)
0.188**
(3.142)
0.188**
(3.062)
0.203**
(3.343)
LD
0.069
(1.122)
0.094
(1.482)
0.073
(1.173)
0.059
(0.950)
0.051
(0.845)
0.083
(1.331)
0.062
(1.011)
Independent variable
FZ
0.229***
 (3.859) 
0.715***
(3.565)
0.435**
(3.515)
 
1.329**
(3.206)
Moderating variable
MF 0.173**(2.824)
0.439**
(2.872)
0.307***
(3.852)
0.437**
(2.719)
XT  -0.072(-1.160)
 0.431**
(2.626)
0.094
(1.335)
0.329*
(1.206)
One-level interaction
XT*FZ -0.559*(-2.481)
0.314*
(2.154)
MF*XT -0.222*(-2.595)
-0.212*
(-2.520)
MF*FZ -0.327†(-1.784)
0.208
(0.985)
Two-level interaction
MF*XT*FZ -0.388†(-1.891)
R 2 0.090 0.042 0.066 0.113 0.134 0.090 0.141
R 2 adjusted 0.076 0.028 0.052 0.093 0.114 0.069 0.107
△R 2 adjusted 0.017 0.038 0.041 0.014
F value 6.397*** 2.87* 4.601** 6.498*** 6.653*** 4.171*** 4.246***
Note. *** p< 0.001 (two-tail), ** p< 0.01 (two-tail), * p<of 0.05 (two-tail).
5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1  Coordination and Competitive Complexity 
Western scholars found that, competitive complexity has 
positive effect on performance, Miller and Chen (1996a) 
argued that a focal firm would not have forbearance with 
competitors if it had not enough variety in the competitive 
actions. Ndofor et al. (2011) revealed that the limit of 
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types of actions of a firm is not only hard to reply the 
attack by competitors, but also hard to satisfy its customers 
(Ndofor, Sirmon & He, 2011). The empirical result of 
Model 1-a, while supporting Miller & Chen (1996a) and 
Ndofor et al. (2011), expending their conclusion into a 
more complex competing situation: focal firm is facing 
multi-types (in strategic orientations, resources, or other) 
of firms. This paper found that if a focal firm needs to (at 
least) gain forbearance with different types of competitors, 
they need to have more that one strategic resource and 
implement actions from different categories of resources 
and capabilities. Therefore, facing multiple types of 
competitors, complexity of competitive repertoire should 
be an effective way for focal firm. 
Literature shows that inner information sharing and 
optimal allocation of resources can help a firm implement 
various competitive actions (Tian & Fan, 2008). Ndofor 
et al. (2011) also found that, competitive complexity have 
meditative effect between technological resources and 
performance. Although few researchers directly discussed, 
there should be an interacting association between 
coordination and competitive complexity, that coordination 
would enlarge the impact of competitive complexity 
on performance. However, this paper did not support 
Ndofor’s idea. Unlike Ndofor et al. (2011), this paper 
study the competitive complexity under special situation 
of focal firm facing multiple types of competitors because 
of Chinese market fragmentation. In “two-line battle”, 
Chinese horizontal integrating firm has to adopt different 
competitive actions basing on different resources and 
capabilities. Therefore, less coordination, instead of more 
coordination, is supporting firm implementing different 
types (or say opposite ways) of actions in one repertoire. 
The major mission of competitive dynamics research is 
to reveal the characters and rules of dynamics competitive 
behavior. Under the dynamic competition, decision 
of competitive action has to figure out the question 
“which action can be effectively, rapidly, and intensively 
implemented”, excepting for “whether and when to start 
an action”. Scholars proposed four dimensional factors 
for answering the question: market commodity which 
indicates the market structure between focal firm and 
competitor, resources similarity which indicates the 
resources comparison between focal firm and competitor, 
top management team which represents the cognition and 
decision mode of focal firm (Chen, 1996; Ferrier & Lyon, 
2004; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996), and organizational 
resources (Lamberg et al., 2009) which indicates the basis 
of action implementation of focal firm. And about the 
organizational resources, scholars only reveal that size of 
firm, organizational structure and so on have effects on 
character of singe competitive action (speed, intension, 
visibility, et al). This paper, on the basis of previous 
researches, forwardly revealed the interrelationship 
between coordination and competitive repertoire. Focal 
firm needs to choose suitable repertoire to fit for its 
operation system and organizational coordination. If the 
competitors are with similar resources and capabilities, 
higher coordination should be help more complexity of 
repertoire; but if the competitors are in multiple types of 
resources, then less complexity of repertoire would be 
more effective under certain coordination. 
5.2   Ef fects  of  Market  Fragmentat ion to 
Competitive Repertoire
Institution Based View (IBV) regards firms embedding 
in a certain institutional context, and the institution have 
influence on any business activities. Recent discusses 
about strategic behavior under market fragmentation 
focus on behavior of horizontal integration, including 
pattern of entering regional market (Wang, 2011), control 
mechanism of headquarter of horizontal organization 
(Wang, 2010), the managerial model (Li, 2011; Ye & 
Huang, 2013), and regional legitimacy (Song & Zeng, 
2011) and political status (Zeng & Song, 2012). But other 
important behavior of Chinese firms, the competitive 
behavior and repertoire, are few discussed. 
As many scholars’ agreement on the impacts of market 
fragmentation on economic resources, this paper further 
revealed that, as Model 2-a, market fragmentation can 
have subversive interrupts to competitive complexity of 
Chinese integrating firms. As the empirical result, when 
the influence of market fragmentation become stronger, 
firm need to decrease the complexity of competitive 
repertoire, so as to fit for the institutional context. The 
main reason is that market fragmentation not only 
separates the scope of action by focal firms, but also 
impacts competitors. Market fragmentation separates 
the scope of domestic market from a centralized one 
into a bundle of regional market and a national market. 
The isolation and administrative hierarchy of Chinese 
domestic market bring more difficulties and higher costs 
for firm with high competitive complexity. Thus when 
the influence of market fragmentation grows, focal firms 
are less likely to apply complex repertoire. On the other 
hand, dynamics of market fragmentation also impact 
competitors of horizontal integrating firms. When the 
influence of market fragmentation grows, focal firms 
will have more benefit to implement innovative action 
than multiple-type repertoire, because innovative action 
is harder for local firms to copy and reply. But when the 
influence of market fragmentation decreases, focal firms 
will have bigger advantage with complex repertoire than 
one singe innovative action mainly facing MNEs. 
The interrupts of market fragmentation is not only 
as above, as Model 2-b, market fragmentation also 
indirectly impacts competitive complexity through 
coordination. Figure 1 demonstrated the simulation 
of regression models by the mix and max value and 
regression coefficient of relative variables. As Model 1-b, 
without concerning market fragmentation, coordination 
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and competitive complexity have negative interacting 
effects on performance. So reasonable matching should be 
high coordination with low complexity, low coordination 
with high complexity. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the 
simulation of coordination and competitive complexity 
present a curved surface which concaving down. But when 
concerning market fragmentation, the curved surface has 
larger curvature concaving down. This means that under 
the impact of market fragmentation, the negative effect of 
coordination and complexity has been weighted. The more 
influence of market fragmentation, the bigger damage 
will be to the effectiveness of coordination, and the less 
complexity of repertoire should be adopted under certain 
coordination.
Figure 1
Moderating Effect of Market Fragmentation to the 
Interaction Between Coordination and Competitive 
Complexity
In one word, this paper discussed the impact of market 
fragmentation to competitive behavior and coordination 
deeply, and revealed that institutional context is not only 
impacting competitive behavior of focal firm directly, 
but also indirectly through impacting its competitor and 
its organizational coordination and relative behavior. The 
conclusion enriches our understanding of institutional 
context, especially market fragmentation, and also helps 
practical decision of Chinese horizontal integrating firms. 
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